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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No.

Plaintiff/Respondent,

870009

v.
Category No. 2

TERRY MARTIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRSTDEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION* OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6302 (1953 AS AMENDED), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
LEONARD H. RUSSON, PRESIDING.
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a
first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(h) (1953 as
amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether

the

state

properly

exercised

its

rights

under

Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).
a*

Whether defendant properly invoked Article III of the
IAD

thus

precluding

the

state

from

exercising

its

Article IV rights.
b.

Whether

defendant's

official

notice of the detainer

lodged against him on May 14, 1986 is violative of
Article

III(c) of the IAD, and would

warrant a dismissal of the charges.

in any event

2.

Whether

Article

III

of

the

IAD

properly

invoked,

requires the 180 day period to be computed from the
date defendant was made available for trial in Utah.
3.

Whether

defendant's

state and

federal

constitutional

rights to a speedy trial were violated.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
1.

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2.

Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953 as amended).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1953 as amended).
(The above provisions are set forth in addendum K.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Terry Martin, was charged in Salt Lake County

with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and
one count of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony (R. 1314).
Defendant moved to dismiss the charges alleging a violation
of his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers § 7729-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) [hereinafter IAD] cind the
Constitution

of

the

State

of

Utah

and

the

United

States

Constitution, occasioned by the state's alleged failure to abide
the terms of the IAD. (R. 16) .
Defendant's motion for dismissal was heard on December 3,
1986.

Memoranda of Points and Authorities were filed by both

parties.

The motion was denied on December 5, 1986 (R. 21-25).

2

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the case was
submitted to the court on a written stipulation of facts and the
transcript of the preliminary hearing without argument (R. 44) •
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony,

as

kidnapping)

charged
was

in

count

dismissed

on

one.
the

Count
State's

two

(aggravated

motion

(R. 49).

Defendant was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State
Prison to commence after being released from the federal prison
system (R. 51).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts in the present appeal were stipulated to
in a pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the
charges held December 3, 1986.

The stipulation allowed for two

defense and seven state exhibits to be received into evidence (R.
79).

(The exhibits are reproduced in the addendum.)

Additional

aspects of the stipulation are discussed as they become relevant.
On

November

19,

1985, while

being

detained

authorities awaiting trial on federal charges

by

federal

in New Mexico

defendant requested the use of the institution's law library to
"look

up

case

history

and

affidavits

California, Washington, and Utah."
request

was

denied

because

of

extradition

(addendum J, R. 74).

defendant

had

assigned

from
The

counsel

(presumably on the pending federal charges) (addendum J, R. 74).
On January

17, 1986, defendant was sentenced on the federal

charges in New Mexico (R. 73).
In a letter dated February 21, 1986, Peter Schoenburg, an
Assistant Federal Public Defender, sent a letter to Richard
3

Shepherd,
stating

Assistant
that

[County] Attorney

defendant

Bernlello County

was

currently

for Salt

Lake County,

incarcerated

in

the

(New Mexico) Detention Center, but might be

transferred to a United States prison for continued service of
his sentence

(addendum A) .

The letter also requested "final

disposition . . . of any indictment, information or complaint or
other

charge

pending"

against

the defendant.

The request,

although mentioning the IAD, did not otherwise attempt to comply
with any procedures necessary to invoke the IAD.
A letter dated March 13, 1986, was sent to Mr. Shepherd by
the

United

States

Marshall's

service

indicating

that

the

defendant had been transferred to the United States Prison in
Lompoc, California to serve his federal sentence (addendum B) .
The letter also indicated that the Salt Lake County warrant was
forwarded to Lompoc.
On April 11, 1986, Mr. Shepherd made a formal request for
temporary custody of defendant under the provisions of Article
IV of the IAD

(addendum C) .

The request was accompanied by

Agreement on Detainers Form V (addendum D) , thus complying with
the appropriate procedures under the Article IV of the IAD.

The

letter was returned marked "moved" with the notation "transferred
court"

(see

addendum

C).

Investigation

defendant had been temporarily
action by
District

revealed

California

for

the

transferred to Sacramento for

the United States District Court
of

that

action

violation (addendum E ) .

4

relating

for the Eastern
to

a

probation

On May 14, 1986, defendant was formally notified by Lompoc
Prison officials that they were aware of the Salt Lake County
charges

pending

detainer

against

him

(thus lodging the charges as a

for purposes of the IAD)

(addendum I) .

They also

notified him of his rights under the IAD to request disposition
of the charges

(addendum I).

A letter dated May 14, 1986,

(termed a "Detainer Action Letter") was sent to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office indicating that the federal institution
in Lompoc

had officially

notified

the defendant,

Terry Dale

Martin, that the Salt Lake County charges had been filed as a
detainer against Mr. Martin.

The letter further indicated that

the defendant was currently on a federal writ and that upon his
return

"we will

Stipulation

of

continue
counsel

the

IAD

process."

acknowledged

that

the

(addendum E).
defendant,

if

called, would testify that he was not advised by the custodial
officials of the detainer prior to May 14, 1986

(R. 79-80).

Defendant, when notified of the detainer, purportedly indicated a
desire to invoke Article III of the IAD.1
A letter dated May 29, 1986 was received by the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office from Carl A. Larson, Chief Assistant
Federal

Defender

for the

Sacramento (addendum F) .

Eastern

District

of

California

in

The letter indicated that defendant's

probation had been revoked and the defendant had been sentenced
1

Defense counsel argues this assertion as fact, however,
the assertion is merely based on an inference drawn from the
handwriting on the top left corner of the notice of detainer
reading, "wants to file on these."
(addendum H) . The record
does not reveal who made the notation or indicate any of the
attendant circumstances which led to the notation being made
(See, R. 83-84).
5

in

the

United

Californiaf
attached.

States

a copy

Court

of the

for

the

Eastern

judgment dated May

District

of

28, 1986 was

That same letter also requested a speedy trial on the

Utah charges or alternatively that the Utah charges be dismissed
(because of the length of the federal sentence).
Defendant was returned-to Lompoc on June 4, 1986 (R. 73).
On June 18, 1986, Mr. Shepherd sent a letter addressed to
the legal clerk at the United States Prison at Lompoc, requesting
the current status of Salt Lake County's request (under Article
IV of the IAD) for temporary custody (addendum G) .

The letter

indicated a willingness to take custody as soon as possible in
view of defendant's request for a speedy trial.

A copy of the

letter was also sent to the defendant.
On August 22, 1986, Mr. Shepherd received a letter from the
administrative

systems

manager

at

Lompoc

along

with

the

necessary forms for temporary custody under Article IV of the IAD
(addendum H) .

The letter indicated that defendant had been

advised of Utah's request for custody on May 14, 1986 and that
pursuant

to

institution
custody.

Article

IV,

30

days

must

elapse,

before

the

could make the defendant available for temporary

The thirty days would expire on June 15, 1986.

The

form to deliver temporary custody was signed by the defendant.
No explanation was offered for the delay in sending the forms to
Salt Lake County.
Counsel stipulated that the defendant was booked in the Salt
Lake County Jail on October 24, 1986 (R. 79).

Defendant was

tried on the Utah charges 53 days later on December 16, 1986.
6

On November 24, 1986 defendant moved to dismiss the charges
alleging that his rights under the IAD had been violated (R. 16).
The motion was heard in the pre-trial hearing on December 3, 1986
(R. 72) .

Points and Authorities were submitted by both counsel

(R. 26-42)•

After hearing argument, the court found thatf (1)

"the state properly exercised its rights under Article IV of the
Act on disposition of detainers against prisoners [IAD] in April
of 1986f

. . ."

(R. 23) •

(2) "[T]he defendant made no proper

invocation under the provisions of Article III
prior to May 14, 1986"
180 day period

[of the IAD]

(R. 24). And (3) "that in any case, the

of Article III would not commence until the

defendant was returned to the state [sic] prison at Lompoc after
sentencing in Sacramento, and finally made available for trial in
Utah."

(R. 24).

The court based its findings on the same

stipulated facts and evidence presented to this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The present appeal centers around a determination respecting
which

party

properly

invoked

Agreement on Detainers (IAD).

the

terms

of

the

Interstate

Defendant claims to have invoked

Article III of the IAD based on two letters written by counsel
and/or a notation reading "wants to file on these" marked on the
corner of defendant's notice of detainer dated May 14, 1986 (see,
addendum A, F and I).

Defendant does not claim that Utah failed

to follow proper procedures necessary to invoke Article IV of the
IAD,

only that it was precluded from invoking Article IV by

defendant's having first invoked Article III.

7

Article III outlines specific procedures a defendant must
follow in order to invoke the terms of the IAD.

Notably, the

defendant must notify the prosecuting officer and the appropriate
court in the prosecutor's jurisdiction.
request

A written notice and

for final disposition given to the proper custodial

officials will be forwarded by the custodial officials to the
appropriate officers.
Defendant's letters from which he claims to have invoked
Article III are addressed

to the prosecutor alone.

By the

language of the statute, letters addressed only to the prosecutor
are not sufficient to invoke the terms of Article III.

Williams

v. Maryland, 445 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1978); Grey v. Benson, 443
F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (D. Kan. 1978); State v. Smith, 669 P.2d 368
(Or. App. 1983).
Defendant's additional claim that he gave appropriate notice
to prison officials evidenced by a notation reading, "wants to
file on these" on his notice of detainer fails for two reasons.
First, defendant did not receive the notice of detainer until May
14, 1986, in April of 1986 Utah had already properly invoked the
provisions of Article IV, thus precluding defendant from a later
invocation of the IAD in May of 1986.

Secondly, the notation is

by itself is insufficient to establish that defendant filed a
written request for final disposition.

At best the notation

raises an inference that defendant may have given notice to his
case manager of an intention to invoke Article III of the IAD in
the future.

8

Defendant's argument that Utah charges should be dismissed
because he did not receive prompt notification of the detainer
must

fail

defense

because

counsel

the

record

suggest,

neither establishes, nor does

when

the

detainer

was

filed.

Furthermore, dismissal of charges based on an alleged violation
of the prompt notice requirement found in Article III(c) does not
warrant a dismissal of the charges.
Even if this Court finds that defendant invoked Article III,
the 180 day period to bring defendant to trial must be computed
from the time defendant was made available for trial in Utah.
Article VI of the IAD provides that the running of time periods
"shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is
unable

to

stand

trial, as

jurisdiction of the matter."
339, 342 (8th cir. 1979).

determined

by

the

court

having

Accord, Young v. Mabrv, 596 F.2d

The defendant was not made available

for trial earlier than receipt of a letter dated August 22, 186,
therefore, Utah brought the defendant to trial well within the
180 day provision.
Defendant's rights to a speedy trial under both the United
States and Utah Constitutions were not violated.

The purpose of

a speedy trial right is to guard against any intentional delay
which may be oppressive or prosecutorial in nature.

U.S.

v.

Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
Concerns behind speedy trial provisions do not appear to be
present in the instant case.
stemming

from

the

Utah

There was no pretrial incarceration
charges.

Defendant

was

already

incarcerated on federal charges in New Mexico, sentenced and
9

serving time in Lompoc.

Under such circumstances, the concerns

for

disruption

loss

of

liberty,

of

employment,

strain

on

financial resources and exposure to public obloquy are clearly
non-existent.
in the

Defendant who was subject to federal jurisdiction

District

of New Mexico

and the Eastern District of

California (addendum A and F) and state jurisdiction in Utah and
possibly Washington now seeks to use his own misconduct as a
basis to avoid legitimate criminal charges.
Assuming the purposes behind

the speedy trial provisions

were present in this case, the facts of each case should be
reviewed.

Accordingly, the standard of review establish by

Barker v. Wincro, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), which examines the (i)
length of delay, (ii) reasons for the delay, (iii) defendant's
efforts to assert his right, and (iv) prejudice to the defendant,
clearly indicates that the defendant did not suffer a violation
of his federal or state constitutional right to a speedy trial.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE
IV OF INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD).

Utah's adoption of the Interstate Agreements on Detainers
(IAD), is codified in Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended).
The primary purpose of the IAD is to provide a mechanism for
prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried
charges

that

are

the

subjects

of

detainers

so that prison

rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoner's benefit will
not

be

charges.

disrupted

or

precluded

by

the

existence

of untried

People v. Hicrinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986)
10

(citations omitted).

Accord, Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 448-

49 (1981); Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 Article I (1953 as amended).
Both the state and the defendant have specified responsibilities
under the IAD to fulfill this purpose.
The state where untried

charges are pending

is entitled

under Article IV to acquire temporary

custody of a prisoner

against whom it has lodged a detainer.

Under Article IVf trial

proceedings must be commenced "within 120 days of the arrival of
the prisoner in the receiving state."
The prisoner's right to request disposition of any untried
charges is outlined in Article III.
whenever

during

Article III provides that

a term of imprisonment

there

is pending in

another state an untried Information on which a detainer has been
lodged, he must be brought to trial with 180 days after he has
caused

to

appropriate

be

delivered

court

of

to

the

the

prosecuting

prosecuting

officer

officer's

and the

jurisdiction

written notice of the place of his imprisonment and request for
final disposition.

The written notice and request must be sent

by the prisoner to the official having custody of him, who shall
forward it to the prosecuting official and court by registered
mail.
The present

case calls

for consideration

properly invoked the procedures of the IAD.

of which party

Defendant contends

that two letters written by counsel and/or a notation reading
"wants to file on these" marked on the corner of defendant's
notice of detainer dated May 14, 1986, (see, addendum A, F, and
I) invoked Article III of the IAD.
11

Defendant does not contend that the State of Utah failed to
follow the proper procedures necessary to invoke Article IV, only
that it was precluded from invoking Article IV by defendant's
having first invoked Article III.

Resolution of the present

appeal, therefore, first requires a determination of whether the
defendant sufficiently complied with the procedures necessary to
invoke Article III.

If this Court determines that the defendant

failed to properly invoke Article III, or otherwise qualify for
Article III protection, there is no dispute that the State fully
complied with the provisions of Article IV and that the defendant
was properly convicted under the provisions of the IAD.
A.

The Defendant Did Not
Provisions Of The IAD.

Properly

Invoke

Article

III

Article III of the IAD details specific procedures which are
incumbent

on

a

defendant

wishing

to

avail

himself

of

statutory rights conferred under the IAD.
Article III(a) provides:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a
party state, and whenever during the continuance of the
term of imprisonment there is a pending in any other
party state any untried indictment, information or
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been
lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate
court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his recruest
for a final disposition to be made of the indictment,
information or complaint; . . . .
The request of the
prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner,
stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner
is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the
12

the

prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency
relating to the prisoner.
(Emphasis added).

Article 111(b) further states:

The written notice and request for final disposition
referred to in paragraph fa) hereof shall be given or
sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of
corrections or other official having custody of him, who
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate
to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
(Emphasis added).

Defendant's claim that he invoked the above

provisions by two letters addressed directly to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office bears no resemblance to the requirements
set forth in the statutory language and cannot be construed to
have properly invoked the Article III provisions of the IAD.2

In

Williams v. Maryland, 445 F. Supp. 1216 (D.Md. 1978) , the court
considered
under

whether

the

requirements.

IAD

a defendant

had

complied

alleging violation
with

the

of rights

requisite

notice

The court stated,

[M]ore is required than merely addressing a request to
one of the persons required by the statute to be
notified. . . . The notice provision of the IAD was
obviously enacted to ensure adequate notification to the
state, and its particulars may not be ignored totally. .
. . A prisoner seeking to benefit from the statutory
provisions must first meet the burden of compliance with
the Act.
Id. at 1220.
Generally it is acknowledged that in order for a prisoner
"to

comply

with

Article

III

a

2

charged

prisoner's

only

Defendant's other claim that the notation reading "wants
to file on these" marked on the notice of detainer dated May 14,
1986 (see, addendum I) invoked Article III, even if sufficient to
invoke Article III, occurred after the State had formally
requested temporary custody under Article IV on April 11, 1986
(see, addendum C and D). This claim is discussed infra.
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responsibility is to file a request for final disposition with
the official having custody of him."

State v. Carroll. 670 P.2d

1290, 1292 (Haw. App. 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
It is, however, the prisoner's burden to prove that he filed such
a request with the appropriate official.

Id. at 1292-93.

In the present case, neither of the two letters claiming to
invoke Article III were addressed to or were otherwise brought to
the attention of the federal custodial officials.

Rather they

were sent directly to the prosecutor and him alone.

Thus under

Carroll, defendant's correspondence with the prosecutor alone is
clearly inadequate to successfully invoke Article III.
In Grey v. Benson. 443 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (D. Kan. 1978),
the court ruled that a prisoner's letter to the prosecuting
attorney

alone,

requesting

a

disposition

insufficient to trigger Article III.

of

detainers

Similarly

was

in State v.

Smith, 669 P.2d 368 (Or. App. 1983), the court held that notice
and

request for final disposition under Article III must be sent

by the prisoner to his custodian, not the prosecutor.
370.

Id. at

In Smith, defendant's attempts to initiate speedy trial

proceedings

by

directly

contacting

the

prosecutor

were

ineffective to start the running of the 180 day period of Article
III.

As a result the court rejected defendant's argument that he

was entitled to dismissal of the charges based on the that claim
that

he

substantially

complied

with

requests to the district attorney.

the

statute by

sending

Id. at 370.

Defendant in the present case, should likewise be denied
dismissal of the charges based on the claim that two letters
14

addressed solely to the Salt Lake County Attorney requesting a
speedy trial were sufficient to invoke Article III of the IAD.
Defendant's
with

the

argument

that

requirements

the
of

letters

Article

substantially
III

is

complied

without

merit.

Defendant's failure to notify correctional officials is clearly
not in compliance with the plain language of Article Ill's notice
requirement.
The notation on the notice of detainer indicating "wants to
file on these" (addendum I) arguably might be construed as a
request to custodial
charges;

however,

authorities
two

critical

for a final disposition of
problems

prevent

such

an

interpretation.
First, the State had already officially requested temporary
custody invoking Article IV of the IAD in April of 1986 (R. 23,
addendum C) .

The defendant was thus precluded from invoking

Article III later in May of 1986 (see, addendum I).
Secondly, it is doubtful that the defendant could carry the
burden of proof that he "file[d] a request for final disposition
with the official having custody of him."
93.

Carroll 670 P.2d 1292-

A bare notation reading, "wants to file on these", marked on

the notice of detainer (addendum I) without further explanation
does not establish that the defendant
appropriate prison officials.

"filed a request" with

At best, the notation raises an

inference that the defendant expressed to his case manager an
intention to invoke Article III in the future.
if defendant

orally

showing

he

that

Furthermore, even

notified his case manager,

there

is no

"filed" a request with the official having
15

custody

of

him.

The

language

of Article

111(b)

expressly

provides that "written notice and request for final disposition"
must be sent to the appropriate custodial officials*

There is no

showing of a "written notice" or a "filed request" in the present
case and the record is notably void of any additional facts to
support such a claim.

Therefore, defendant's argument that he

invoked Article III, based on the notation "wants to file on
these" marked on the notice of detainer must fail.
Accordingly

the

trial

court's

finding

that

the

State

properly exercised its rights under Article IV in April of 1986,
and

that the defendant made no proper

invocation under the

provisions of Article III prior to May 14, 1986, should be
sustained.

See. State v. Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238, 124 0 (Utah

1980) (Proper deference must be given to rulings of trial court);
Seibold v. Turner.

20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 289 (1967) (Supreme

Court duty to sustain trial court's ruling based on competent
evidence).
B.

Defendant's Official Notice Of The Detainer Lodged
Against Him On May 14, 1976 Is Not Violative Of Article
III(c), And Would Not In Any Event Warrant A Dismissal
Of The Charges.

Defendant argues that in addition to invoking Article III,
because he did not receive an official notice of detainer until
May 14, 1986, two months after being transferred from New Mexico
to

Lompoc,

the

charges

against

him

should

Defendant's claim is based on the language of

be

dismissed.

Article III(c)

which states:
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other
official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly
16

inform him of the source and
lodged against him and shall
right to make a request for
indictment, information or
detainer in based.
1.

contents of any detainer
also inform him of his
final disposition of the
complaint on which the

Defendant has not established when a detainer was
lodged against him.

The record does not establish nor does defendant assert when
a

detainer

was

filed

against the defendant.

Nevertheless,

defense counsel relying on Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477
(Colo. 1981), asserts that Lompoc officials were dilatory in
notifying the defendant of the detainer lodged against him and
that as a result Utah charges against the defendant should be
dismissed.
detainer

was

(Br. App. at 7-8).
lodged

against

Without establishing when a

him, defendant's

claim must be

considered unfounded and without merit.
In Romans a detainer was lodged against the defendant on May
29, 1980, but defendant did not receive official notice until
October 24, 1980.

Romans 633 P.2d at 479.

The court determined

that as a result of the delay3 coupled with the failure of the
custodial officials to inform the defendant of his rights to
invoke Article III of the IAD, the charges against him should be
dismissed.4

Id. at 481.

3

The court held that the defendant did not enter a term of
imprisonment until August 29, 1980. Thus the delay was computed
from August 29, rather than May 29, 1980.
4

The court in a later decision, People v. Hiainbotham. 712
P.2d 993, 1001 (Colo. 1986), ruled that failure to promptly
inform defendant of a detainer lodged against him and his right
to request final disposition of the charge did not warrant
automatic dismissal; rather, a hearing was ordered to determine
whether the defendant was prejudiced before ordering a dismissal.
17

Defendant in the present case, does not suggest that there
was a delay by custodial officials in informing the defendant of
the detainer.

Rather, defendant argues that the delay from

being transferred to Lompoc on March 12, 1986, until the time he
received notice of the detainer on May 14, 1986, represents
grounds for a dismissal of the charges.

(Br. App. at 7-8).

Admittedly, a Utah warrant was included in the paper work
forwarded to Lompoc in March 1986 as a part of defendants file,
(addendum B) .

However, defendant never intimates that Lompoc

prison officials were aware of outstanding charges or that they
were treating the Utah charges a detainer which would interfere
with defendant's rehabilitation programming5 before it provided
notice to the defendant on May 14, 1986.

Defendant's argument

that charges against the him should be dismissed because he was
not given notice of a detainer against him for sixty-three days
after arriving in Lompoc, without showing or even intimating that
custodial officials delayed in notifying him of the detainer, is
not

only

unsupported

by the language of Article III(c) but

without judicial precedent.
2.

Even if defendant did not receive prompt notice of
the detainer lodged against him, lack of prompt
notice under article III(c) does not justify a
dismissal of the charges.

Under the IAD, dismissal of the charge in the receiving
state is authorized in only three instances:
5

(1) if, after a

Article I states the primary purpose of the IAD is to
eliminate "uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation."
Accord, People v. Hicrinbotham,
712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986) (citations omitted); Cuvler v.
Adams. 449 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1981).
18

prisoner has made the required request pursuant to Article III,
trial does not occur with the required 180 days—Article V(c) ;
(2) when trial does not occur before the prisoner, having been
transferred to the receiving state, is returned to the sending
state—Article IV(e); and (3) when the receiving state fails or
refuses to accept temporary

custody of the

prisoner—Article

V(c).
In State v. Barefield, 735 P.2d 1339 (Wash. App. 1987), the
court noted that cases involving a violation of the prompt notice
provisions of Article III(c) produced split decisions.

See e.g.,

cases not dismissing charges, Coit v. State. 440 So. 409 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (IAD prompt notice provisions directory;
violation thereof does not result in dismissal of charges); State
v. Clark. 222 Kan. 65, 563 P.2d 1028 (1977) (IAD prompt notice
provision directory only because IAD has no sanction for failure
to comply) ;
A. 2d

1039

Commonwealth v. Gonce. 320 Pa. Super. Ct. 19, 466
(1983)

(dismissal

allowed

only

under

explicit

provisions of the IAD). Cases noted dismissing charges included
People v.

Lincoln.

42 Colo. App.

512, 601 P.2d

641

(1979)

(compliance with notice provisions is mandatory), and People v.
Office. 126 Mich. App. 597, 337 N.W.2d 592 (1983) (failure to
bring formal charges against defendant violates good faith and
the spirit of the IAD).

The court in Barefield. where the

defendant did not receive notice of the detainer against him for
over one year, concluded:
Having considered the foregoing cases, we conclude that
Congress intended sanctions to be applied only where
they are expressly allowed under the IAD. To conclude
otherwise would result in ad hoc determinations by
19

individual member states determining whether officials
had acted "promptly".
It is for Congress, not the
courts, to set time limits for giving notice and for
forwarding materials.
We, therefore, hold that
dismissal under the IAD is not mandated in this case.
Barefield 735 P.2d at 1346.
The logic of the Barefield court is especially persuasive in
view of Article IX1 s directive that "[t]his agreement shall be
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes."

Article I

states

eliminate

the

primary

purpose

of

the

IAD

is

to

"uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation."

Accord, People v. Hicrinbotham, 712 P.2d 993,

997 (Colo. 1986) (citations omitted); Cuyler v. Adams. 449 U.S.
433, 448-49

(1981).

Furthermore, "courts have generally held

that prisoners must strictly comply with IAD procedures before
they will dismiss charges on the basis of a violation of Article
III."
473

Nash v. Jeffes. 739 F.2d 878, 884 (3rd cir. 1984) rev'd

U.S. 716

(reversed on other grounds); See, Williams v.

Maryland, 445 F.Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.Md. 1978) ; Gray v. Benson,
443 F.Supp. 1284, 1286

(D.Kan. 1978); People v. Primmer, 59

A.D.2d 221, 222, 399 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (1977), afffd. 46 N.Y.2d
1048,

389

N.E.2d

1070,

416

N.Y.S.2d

548

(1979);

State

v.

Brockinaton, 89 N.J.Super. 423, 430, 215 A.2d 362, 365-66 (1965).
The evidence in the present case indicates that defendant not
only failed to strictly comply with the IAD procedures, but has
even failed to invoke its terms.

It would be contrary to the

purposes of the act, sound statutory construction, and the weight
of

authority

to

provide

the

20

defendant

with

a

windfall

opportunity to avoid legitimate criminal charges pending in this
or any other jurisdiction.
II.

EVEN IF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE III WERE PROPERLY
INVOKED, THE 180 DAY PERIOD MUST BE COMPUTED FROM THE
DATE DEFENDANT WAS MADE AVAILABLE FOR TRIAL IN UTAH.

The trial court's finding that the 180 day period of Article
III would not commence until the defendant was returned to prison
in

Lompoc

after

sentencing

in Sacramento,

and

finally made

available for trial in Utah is supported by the language of
Article VI of the IAD as well as case law.
There are two prerequisites before Article III of the IAD
may be invoked;

(i) the defendant must be serving a term of

imprisonment, and (ii) a detainer must be filed.

Defendant was

sentenced

1986f

on

federal

charges

on

January

17,

but

a

detainer apparently was not lodged anytime prior to May 14,
19866.

Consequently,

defendant

technically could not invoke

Article III any time prior to May 14, 1986.
Article VI of the IAD provides that the running of time
periods "shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner
is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the matter."
339, 342 (8th cir. 1979).

Accord. Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d

When Utah requested temporary custody

under Article IV from Lompoc on April 11, 1986 (addendum C) the
state was informed that the defendant was unavailable because he
was

on a

federal writ,

but

that

6

the

IAD process would be

Neither the record or defense counsel indicate a detainer
was filed prior to May 14, 1986. See discussion under 1(B)(1),
p. 17-18.
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continued when Lompoc reacquired custody (addendum E) .
18, 1986, Utah requested

On June

information regarding the status of

their request for temporary custody under Article IV (ciddendum
G) .

The response to that request was a letter dated August 22,

1986

informing

Utah

that

it could

custody of the defendant (addendum H).

finally

assume

temporary

Accordingly, the 180 day

period of Article III must be computed from the time defendant
was made

available for trial in Utah, which time began no

earlier than upon receipt of the letter dated August 22, 1986,
(addendum H) .
Jail on October

Defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County
24, 1986

(R. 79), and brought to trial on

December 16, 1986, well within the 180 day provision of Article
III.
III. DEFENDANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
A SPEEDY TRIAL WERE NOT VIOLATED.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, Amendment VI; Utah Constitution, Article I,
§ 12.

See also, Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953 as amended).

The right is:
. . . not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the
defense caused by passage of time; that interest is
protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by
statutes of limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is
designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy
incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but
nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed
on an accused while on bail, and to shorten the
disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of
unresolved criminal charges.
United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).

The focus is on

the impairment or "restraint on personal liberty, disruption of
employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public
22

obloquy. . . . "

Id. at 9.

404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).

See also. United States v. Marion.

Similarly, in State v. Weddle. 29 Utah

2d 145, 506 P.2d 67, 68 (1973), this Court noted that:
The right to a speedy trial assured by our Constitutions
refers, of course, not to the speed at which a trial
proceeds, but rather to the right of an accused to be
brought to trial without undue delay. This is a right of
ancient origin which arose because of abuses wherein
people were kept in custody for unreasonable periods of
time without trial and even without knowing any abuse of
that character. But in the absence thereof, it should
not be extended as a mere abstraction of law in
circumstances where there is no justification for its
application. The statement itself is general and there
is no particular length of time which can be specified as
a standard in all instances in order to avoid
infringement of the right. The correct application of
the principle depends upon the facts of each case. The
total picture should be looked at to see whether there
has been any such abuse of imposition upon the accused as
the provision was designed to protect against, so that he
was prejudiced in having a fair trial and just treatment
under the law.
In State v. Archuletta. 577 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah 1977), this Court
stated:
The purpose of those constitutional provisions is to
guard against any intentional delay which may be
oppressive or prosecutorial in nature. U.S. v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed. 627 (1966).
The concerns behind speedy trial provisions are not present
in the

instant

stemming

from

case.
the

There was no pretrial

Utah

charges.

Defendant

incarceration
was

already

incarcerated on federal charges in New Mexico, sentenced and
serving time in Lompoc.

Under such circumstances, the concerns

for

disruption

loss

of

liberty,

of

employment,

strain

on

financial resources and exposure to public obloquy are clearly
non-existent.

Moreover, the record indicates defendant was aware

of Utah charges as early as November 19, 1986
23

(addendum J ) .

Defendant

who

was

subject

to

federal

jurisdiction

in

the

District of New Mexico and the Eastern District of California
(addendum A and F) and state jurisdiction in Utah and possibly
Washington now seeks to use his own misconduct as a basis to
avoid legitimate criminal charges.
Assuming

the purposes behind

were present in this casef
reviewed.

the speedy trial provisions

the facts of each case should be

The United States Supreme Court has noted that whether

the federal speedy trial right has been violated is determined by
balancing the " . . . length of delay, the reason for the delay,
the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.

Barker v. Winqo. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

considerations also apply under the Utah Constitution.

Similar
State v.

Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Utah 1984); State v. Knill. 656 P.2d
1026,

1029 (Utah 1982); State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116

(Utah 1982); State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1979); State
v. Giles. 576 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1978).

This Court elaborated

on the above factors in Weddle as follows:
In making that determination, where there has been what
may appear to be undue delay, it is important to
consider whether or not there was justification for it
including:
(1) which party caused it; (2) whether it
may have been wilful and/or for some improper purpose;
(3) whether the defendant was aware of his rights; (4)
whether he made known his desire for a speedy trial; (5)
whether by words or conduct there was explicit or
implicit waiver; and (6) whether the proceeding was
completed as soon as reasonably could be done in the
circumstances.
Weddle 506 P.2d at 68. Application of these factors demonstrates
no violation of defendant's speedy trial rights.
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1.

LENGTH OF DELAY

Defendant in the present case was booked into Salt Lake
County Jail on October 24, 1986 (R. 79) and brought to trial 53
days later on December 16, 1986.

Defendant makes no argument

that 53 days represents a violation of his speedy trial rights.
Defendant, argues however, that the delay should be computed
from November 19, 1986, when defendant requested use of the law
library while in federal prison on other charges (Br. App. at 21,
addendum J ) .

Defendant's assertion why the delay should be

measured from this date rather than when defendant was in Utah's
custody is unsupported by any legal analysis and fails to reflect
an understanding of the purposes underlying speedy trial rights.
In any event, should this Court accept defendant's argument, the
purported delay in this case, is relatively short, not more than
13 months.

(Br. App. at 21).

The Supreme Court in Barker indicated there is no precise
point at which the delay becomes prejudicial per se. Rather, the
inquiry must be determined on an ad hoc basis considering the
circumstances in each case.

Id. 530-31.

In Barker, the delay

between arrest and trial was over five years, and the conviction
was still upheld.
2.

The same result should be reached in the case.

REASONS FOR DELAY

Delays

in the present case, if they in fact exist, are

solely attributable to prior illegal acts of the defendant which
caused several jurisdictions to compete for his custody, all
wanting to bring the defendant to trial.
Court stated:
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In Barker, the Supreme

Closely related to length of delay is the reason
the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too,
different weights should be assigned to different
reasons.
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in
order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily
against the government. A more neutral reason such as
negligence or overcrowded prisons should be weighed less
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the
ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest
with the government rather than with the defendant.
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker

407

U.S. at

531

(Footnote

omitted,

emphasis

added).

Defendant's unavailability to stand trial in Utah because of a
foreign jurisdiction's custody must be considered a valid reason
which justifies appropriate delay.
In State v. Archuletta. 577 P.2d 547, 548-49 (Utah 1977),
referring to the right of speedy trial, this Court stated:
The purpose of those constitutional provisions is
to guard against any intentional delay which may be
oppressive or prosecutorial in nature. . . . [T]he
court does not lose jurisdiction . . . unless there is
some intentional delay of an oppressive character, which
results in prejudice to the defendant[.]
The rule is firmly established that any delay attributable
to the defendant should not be considered in determining whether
his right to a speedy trial was denied.

See, State v. Weddle.

506 P.2d at 68; State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116; State v.
Kellv, 123 Ariz. 24, 597 P.2d 177, 179 (1979); and Cherniwchan v.
State. 594 P.2d 464, 468 (Wyo. 1979).
Defendant committed several illegal acts which resulted in
competition between several jurisdictions to bring the defendant
to trial or to revoke his probation.
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While in the federal

custody defendant was beyond the jurisdiction

of Utah which

effectively precluded Utah from commencing its prosecution.7
The record does not contain any facts which would indicate
that the State engaged in any actions which were intentionally
oppressive, dilatory, willful, or for an improper purpose, or
even negligent.

Moreover, the delay was largely attributable to

acts of the defendant.
3.

DEFENDANT'S EFFORTS TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT

Defendant may assert that he attempted to assert his right
to a speedy Utah trial through letters dated February 21, 1986
and May 29, 1986.
rights

occurred

However, defendant's attempt to assert his
while

he

was

incarcerated

in

jurisdictions and unavailable for custody in Utah.

foreign
When Utah

gained temporary custody on October 24, 1986, defendant's right
to a speedy trial was properly honored, defendant being brought
to trial in 53 days.
Again it is important to recognize that any delay, which
could arguably amount to a violation of defendant's right to a
speedy trial, resulted from defendant's own misconduct which led
foreign jurisdictions to compete for defendant's custody.
Court

has

recognized

that

a

defendant

may

explicitly waive his right to a speedy trial.
at 68.

implicitly

This
or

Weddle, 506 P.2d

Despite defendant's written requests for a speedy trial,

this court may properly hold that, defendant, through his conduct,

See related discussion under Point II, p. 21-22.
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either explicitly or implicitly waived his right to a speedy
trial.
4.

PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT

In Barker, the Supreme Court pointed out that the right to a
speedy trial is different from other constitutional rights in
that the deprivation of that right may in fact work to the
defendant's advantage.
Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time
between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens,
witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may
fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case
will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the
prosecution which carries the burden of proof.
Thus,
unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to
speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's
ability to defend himself.
Barker 407 U.S. at 521-22.
Evaluation of the prejudice suffered by the defendant should
be assessed in light of the interests which the speedy trial
right was designed to protect.

As was shown earlier, those

interests are not present in the instant case.
oppressive

pretrial

incarceration

clearly

does

The concern for
not

apply

in

defendant's case.
Furthermore, defendant does not cite even one instance of
prejudice experienced

during his trial on the Utah charges.

Defendant's only claim of prejudice is a weak unsubstantiated
inference

that

his

rehabilitation

process

may

have

interfered with, contrary to the purpose of the IAD.

been
This

claim, however, finds absolutely no support from the record.
Lompoc prison officials apparently did not consider the detainer
28

lodged against the defendant until May 14, 1986.

When Utah

requested temporary custody from Lompoc in April 1986, Lompoc
replied that defendant was away on a federal writ (addendum E)
and

therefore

not

within

their

custody.

Obviously,

when

defendant was not in the custody of the only custodial officials
aware of the detainer lodged against him, his rehabilitation
programming could not be interfered with.

Defendant was returned

to Lompoc on June 4, 1986, (R. 73) and thereafter released to
Utah custody in October 1986 (R. 79) .

Clearly any interference

with defendant's rehabilitation programming would be minimal at
best

during

importantly,

the

period

defendant

of

does

June
not

to

October

attempt

to

1986.
articulate

More
any

instance of prejudice or example of rehabilitation interference.
This Court has repeatedly

refused to reverse convictions

where the defendant has failed to establish any specific or real
prejudice.

See e.g. . State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d at 1193 (no

prejudice where both defendants were granted pretrial release);
State v. Knill, 656 P.2d at 1029 (defendant "makes no persuasive
allegation of prejudice for delay"); State v. Menzies. 601 P.2d
925, 926 (Utah 1979) ("period which elapsed before trial neither
inconvenienced nor prejudiced defendant").

In the present case,

defendant fails to make any persuasive allegations of prejudice,
therefore, any prejudice suffered by the defendant is speculative
at best.
Consideration of the analysis under the four prong test of
Barker indicates that defendant has not suffered a violation of
his federal or state constitutional right to a speedy trial.
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CONCLUSION
Based

on the

foregoing

arguments, the State respectfully

requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
Dated this 2-*

day of March, 1988
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
DISTRICT OF N E W MEXICO
P. O. BOX 3 0 6
A L B U Q U E R Q U E . N E W MEXICO 8 7 1 0 3
TOVA INDRITZ
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

TELEPHONE

(505) 766-3293

February 21, 1986

FTS 4 7 4 - 3 2 9 3

Mr. Richard Shepherd
Assistant District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

TERRY DALE MARTIN

Dear Mr. Shepherd:
Please be aware that Terry Dale Martin is currently incarcerated
at the Bernalillo County Detention Center in Albuquerque, New
Mexico pursuant to a seven year sentence imposed by U.S. District
Court Judge Juan Burciaga in the District of New Mexico in
Criminal No. 85-219. He is hereby requesting final disposition
by your office of any indictment, information or complaint or
other charge pending against Mr. Martin in your jurisdiction.
The Bernalillo County Detention Center's address is P.O. Box
1293, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103. The phone number there is
(505) 842-8008.
Mr. Martin may, in the near future, be transferred to a United
States Prison for continued service of his seven year sentence.
Should that happen, his location can be determined by contacting
the Unites States Marshallfs Office in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
phone number (505) 766-2933. It is my client's specific interest
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, his state
constitutional right to a speedy trial and due process and his
federal constitutional right to speedy trial and due process to
have the charges pending in your office disposed of as soon as
possible by trial or otherwise.
Please contact me, his counsel in federal district court here in
New Mexico, if you need any aditional information regarding Mr.
Martin's demand for speedy trial.
(

Sin^er^ly,

Piter Schoenburg j
Assistant Federal Public Defender

PS/lh-1

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
P.O. BOX 3 0 6
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Mr. Richard Shepherd
Assistant District Attorney
231 East 400 South
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ADDENDUM B

U.S. Department of Justice
United States Marshals Service
District of New Mexico

12403 United States Courthouse and Federal Building
500 Gold Avenue, Southwest
Post Office Box 444
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103

March 13, 1986

Richard S. Shepherd
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

MARTIN, Terry D.
Reg. No.: 02960-051

Dear Mr. Shepherd:
Your warrant on above subject was forwarded along with our
paperwork to USP Lompoc where Terry Martin will serve his sentence.
You will need to write to the records office to assure your warrant
is outstanding. Write to the following address:
United States Penitentiary
Attn: Records
3901 Klein Blvd.
Lompoc, California 93436
Sincerely,

D. R. BACA
United States Marshal
DRB/cj

j§>alt THake (Hmutty JVttnrnc^
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Terry Dale Martin, Inmate
RETURN TO SENDER
bAlOVED
O N O T ACCEPTABLE
()INMATE UNKNOWN
ONEED INMATES FULL NAME & REG *

ADDENDUM C

<§ti\CB of % ^ait T&nkt (Sountg ^ttovnzy
T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney

MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ
Chiof Deputy County Attorney

April 11, 1986

Warden
United States Penitentiary
3901 Klein Boulevard
Lompoe, California 93436
Re:

Terry Dale Martin
Reg. No. 02960-051

Dear Warden:
I am making inquiry regarding Terry Dale Martin, whom I
understand is currently housed in your institution. We have a
local charge pending against said prisoner and wish to begin
proceedings on the Interstate Agreement of Detainers.
I am enclosing herewith Agreement on Detainers Form V
requesting temporary custody in order that you may begin the
appropriate procedures under the Detainers Act.
Would you please verify that the above individual is in your
institution and inform me of the terms of said prisoner1s
confinement. Thank you for your assistance.

RICHARD S. SHEPHERD
Deputy County Attorney
kc/0173T
pc: Terry Dale Martin
Irving Marks

231 East 4th South
O County Attorney Victim Services

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
C3 Justice Division

(801) 363-7900

O Investigative Agency

D Civil Division

D Governmental Servia

ADDENDUM D

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS FORM V
Five copies. Signed copies must be sent to the prisoner and
should be sent to the Agreement Administrator of the state which
has the prisoner incarcerated. Copies should be retained by the
person filing the request and the judge who signs the request.
REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY CUSTODY
TO:

WARDEN, UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY
3901 Klein Boulevard, Lompoc, California 93436

Please be advised

that Terry Dale Martin, who is presently an

inmate of your institution, is under Information in the County of
Salt Lake, of which I am a Deputy County Attorney.

Said inmate

is therein charged with the offense(s) enumerated below:
OFFENSE
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony
Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony
I propose

to bring

this person to trial

on this

Information

within the time specified in Article IV(c) of the agreement.
order
hereby

that proceedings
request

In

in this matter may be properly had, I

temporary

custody

of

such

person

pursuant

to

Article IV(a) of the Agreement on Detainer^")
Signed:
Title:

/^Cw^£^
RfCHARD S.
Deputy County Attorney

I hereby certify that the person whose signature appears above is
an appropriate officer within the meaning of Article IV(a) and
that the facts recited in the request for temporary custody are

Agreement on Detainers Form V
Page 2

correct
transmit

and

that having

it for

action

duly

recorded

said

request, I hereby

in accordance with the terms and the

provisions of the Agreement on Detainers.

Dated:

kc/0155T

rt?(L,U

JI &%£*
1

^^^iHL^rf^
(Court)

ADDENDUM E

Institution

USP, Lompoc, CA

U. S. Department of Justice
Bureau of Prisons

Date

May 14, 1986
DN LETTER
JO- Office of the Salt Lake County Attjj.
231 E. 4th South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Number

1 Inmate's Name

MARTIN, T e r r y Dale

02960-051

Your

1 SAME

W a r r a n t No: 85FS02430

Dear Sir:
The below checked paragraph relates to the above named inmate:
•

This office is in receipt of the following report regarding the above named:
. Will you please investigate this report and advise
what disposition, if any, has been made of the case. If subject is wanted by your department and you wish
a detainer placed, it will be necessary for you to forward a certified copy of your warrant to us.
A detainer has been filed against this subject in your favor charging

Aggravated Robbery and
06-18-1990 via2/3rds
Aggravated Kidnapping
. Release is tentatively scheduled for
however we will again notify you approximately 60 days prior to actual release.
Q Enclosed is your detainer warrant Your detainer against the above named has been removed in compliance with your request
•

Your letter dated

requests notification prior to the release of the above named

prisoner. Our records have been noted. Tentative release date at this time is
Q I am returning your

on the above named inmate who was committed to this institution on
to serve

for the offense of

.

If you wish your
filed as a detainer, please return it to us with a cover letter stating your
desire to have it placed as a hold or indicate you have no further interest in the subject
Q The above named inmate has been transferred to
Your detainer/notification request has been forwarded.

(3 Other: Currently this inmate i s on a Federal Writ.
continue IAD process.

for

Record F o r m eY
April, i S 7 t

Upon his return, we w i l l

jrgal Clerk
Adrfrfnistrative Systems Manager or
Chief Record Officer
Original White-Addn
Pint Copy (Green) • Judgment & Commitment File
Second Copy (Canary) • Inmete
Third Copy (Pink). Centre! File (Section 1)
Fourth Copy (OoWenrod) • Correctional Services Department

UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY—^
3901 Klein Blvd.
lJt
Lompoc, CA 93436
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use,

VL

ATTN:

21

.
»v\
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JU84

$300

Office of the Salt Lake County Attorney
231 E. 4th South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Richard S. 'Shepherd, Deputy County Attorney

ADDENDUM F

O F F I C E OF T H E FEDERAL DEFENDER
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
1 128 FIREHOUSE ALLEY
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 9 5 8 1 4

<FTS> * 6 ° - i ° 6 7

E. R I C H A R D W A L K E R

<9I6> " I *

FEDERAL DEFENDER

May 29, 1986

Mr. Dick Shepard, Esq.
281
400 South
281 East
East 400
south
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111
Re:

COUNTY ATTORNEY
JUSTICE DIVISION

U.S. v. Terry Dale Martin
Cr.S 85-167 EAR

Dear Mr. Shepard:
Mr. Martin received a five (5) year sentence
in the Eastern District of California to run consecutively to the seven (7) year sentence that he
is now serving. His total sentence is twelve (12)
years.
On behalf of Mr. Martin, I would like to
reassert his demand for speedy trial on the
charges pending in Utah. In light of his lengthy
federal sentence, I would also request that the
charges pending in your jurisdiction be dismissed.
If you have any questions on this matter,
please feel free to contact me. With best wishes,
I remain,
Respectfully yours,

CARL A. LARSON
Chief Asst. Federal Defender
CEL:dls
Enclosure

1 0 6 7

EASTERN DISTRICT »F (\*LiFuRKiA

*fe^

CP. i.-i*5-167

TERRT DALE KARTIfl
DOCKET NO.

JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER
" \ In the presence of the attorney for the government
the defendant appeared in person on this date
—
I W I T H O U T COUNSEL

I

1 W I T H COUNSEL

MONTH

Hay

AO 245 (9/S2)

DAY

.

28

1%fj

YEAR

However the court advised defendant of right to counsel and asked whether defendant desired to hav
counsel
nsel appointed
appointed by
by the
the court
court and
an the defendant thereupon waived assistance of counsel.

Can Larson, Esq.

I

(Name of Counsel)

pin

}

GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea,

<

I NOLO CONTENDERE,

I NOT GUILTY

NOT GUILTY. Defendant is discharged

f

There being a finding/vVf&fct
iffct <of

I

o
GUILTY.

HN0M61

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of

Viola

*»V- o f

Title

<•'•. USC o £ o 1 ( r j ;

-

^Pcssoss^en of Uf reqisicred Firvarr! as efcarced ir. ' r !nri*rtrv»rt <* tK* Kort^er*
3istr<ct of California, ^^e defendant f*avtr$ auoittci violirij;i of allegation
#5 of the petition, the Court hereby revokes probation zn? passes sentence as
follows:

The court asked whether defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to the contrar
was shown, or appeared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that; The defendant i
hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney Ceneral or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of r I V E \ j)

YEARS pursuant to 4 ^ ( a ) , tne defendant is to receive credit for t1«e served.
*IT IS OKDLHED TiIAT tne sentence is to run consecutively* one after the other* with
any sentence tiat lie is now serving.

FILED
MAY a t

MtMSWSsL
mmoNAL
DNOmQNS
OF
WBATOM

M addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it b hereby ordered that the general conditions of probation seTouVorTtht
reverse side of this iudgment be imposed. The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation, anc
at any tame during the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by iaw, may issue a warrant anc
revoke probation for a violation occurring during the probation period.

The court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends,

MTM

It Is ordered that the Clem deliver
a certified copy of (nW Judgment
and commitments© the#U.S. Mar*
shal or other qu^fieaoffiter.
CERTIFIED AS ATRUE CORDON

Ntoit

Li-*

THIS DATE
^
*

< V M~eV
^ *

w

>t'e

OFFICE O F T H E FEDERAL D E F E N D E R
EASTERN

DISTRICT OP CALIFORNIA

1125
FIREHOUSE ALLEY
SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 9 5 8 1 4
OFFICIAL SU0INKSS
FCNALTV WQm PIIIVATC USB

SSOO

*

-

A

Dicfc/Shepard, Esq.
400 South
Lake City, Utah 84111

cou v r y ^ : r , , v , . .

Postage and Fees P u d
Untied States Courts
USC 424

ADDENDUM G

A. J. Battles, Legal Clerk
United States Penitentiary
3901 Klein Boulevard
Lompoc, California 93436
Re:

Inmate Terry Dale Martin
Reg. No. 02960-051

Dear A. J. Battles:
I received your detainer action letter of May 14, 1986,
regarding the above-named inmate. I was subsequently notified by
the office of the Federal Defender that he was sentenced in the
United
States District
Court
for the Eastern District
of
California on May 28, 1986.
Could you advise me as to the
current status of our request for custody under the Interstate
Act on Detainers.
Mr. Martin has had counsel indicate his demand for a speedy
trial and we are ready to take custody for the purpose as soon as
he is available.

RICHARD S. SHEPHERD '
Deputy County Attorney
kc/0304T
cc: Terry Dale Martin

231 East 4th South
tmtton

O County Attorney Victim Services

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
B Justice Division

(801) 363-7900

a Investigative Agency

D Civil Division

D Governmental Services

ADDENDUM H

U. S. Department of Justice
Federal Prison System
U. S. Penitentiary

3901 Kkin Blvd.
Lompoc, CA 93436

Auqust 22. 1986
T.L. Cannon
Attorney for Salt Lake County
231 E. 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:
MARTIN, Terry D.
Reg#: 02960-051
DOB: 11-04-52
Dear Mr. Cannon:
Pursuant to your request for temporary custody of Mr. Martin under Article IV
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, enclosed are forms BP-DIR-93 and 94.
Article IV provides "that there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt
by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored." You request was
received by this office during May, 1986.
Mr. Martin was advised of your
request on May 14, 1986. Therefore Mr. Martin will be available to be taken
into state custody on or after June 15, 1986, unless you are notified to the
contrary.
Before we can transfer Mr. Martin to your custody, we must receive
the Agreement on Detainers Form VI (Evidence of Agent's Authority to Act for
Receiving State).
Final arrangements for pickup may be made by contacting our Administrative
Systems Department at 805-735-2771.
Please have your agents contact them 48
hours prior to pickup.
Be assured of our continued cooperation in matters of mutual interest.
Sincerely,

JL/\ Peggy Kinman
*^ Administrative Syst
Systems Manager

cc:

Clerk of the Court
Compact Administrator
] i C File
Inmate

CT-D1R-93
2-71

BUREAU OF PRISONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor under
Article IV, copy of this Form should be sent to the prosecutor upon receipt by the warden of
Form 5. Copies also should be sent to all other prosecutors in the same state who have lodged
detainers against the inmate. A copy may be given to the inmate.

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS

RE:

„_MARTIN, Terry
(Inmate)

JI? p jL_ Loxn P oc i

02960-051
(Number)

Lc

?!}P 0 Jil. c^l

(Institution)

(Location)

The (custodial authority) hereby certifies:
1. The term of commitment under which the prisoner above named is being held: 7 y e a r s
4205(a)
2. The time already served: Date s e n t e n c e d 0 1 - 1 7 - 7 6 7-months +90 days J . C ,
J a i l C r e d i t : 1 0 - 1 9 - 8 5 t o 0 1 - 1 8 - 8 6 = 90 d a y s
3. Time remaining to be served on the sentence:
4. The amount of good time earned:

2251 d a y s

56 d a y s

5. The date of parole eligibility of the prisoner: 0 2 - 1 6 - 8 8
6. The decisions of the Board of Parole relating to the prisoner: (if additional space is
needed use reverse side) N / A
7. Maximum expiration date under present sentence:

10-18-92

8. Detainers currently on file against this inmate from your state are as follows:
Agg. Robbery/Agg. Kidnapping

DATED: .^?^.A 2 .I.A 9 .Ll
Edwin Meese, III-U.S. Atty. General
Custodial Authority

x
FPMbOM-l-14.77

Z^sJ<0^^^

BY. _ Peggy Kinman^ Admin._ System Mgr,
BY:

LP-DIR-94
2-71

BUREAU OF PRISONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor this Form
should be completed after the Warden has indicated his approval of the request for temporary custody or after the expiration of the 30 day period. Copies of this Form should then be
sent to all officials who previously received copies of Form 3. One copy also should be given to
the prisoner and one copy should be retained by the warden. Copies mailed to the prosecutor
should be sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested.

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
OFFER TO DELIVER TEMPORARY CUSTODY
Date „Mgust.2j2. L „1.986.
,n n
TO:

Mr. T . L . Cannon

^
.. - _ .
Prosecuting Officer

(Insert Name and Title if Known)

...Aalt..Lajce - Cj.ty^^Ujtah
(Jurisdiction)

And to all other prosecuting officers and courts of jurisdictions listed below from which indictments, informations or complaints are pending.
RE:

mRTTTV.-Tarry

— Number

Q2M0rJ3.51.CLl

(Inmate)

Dear Sir:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V of the Agreement on Detainers between this state
and your state, the undersigned hereby offers to deliver temporary custody of the above-named
prisoner to the appropriate authority in your state in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had of the indictment, information or complaint which is (described in the attached
inmate's request) (described in your request for custody of Jl^Xl^B£).
(Date)
(The required Certificate of Inmate Status is enclosed.) (ff*«*aq*i«ied^ito*ic^
(Date)
If proceedings under Article IV (d) of the Agreement are indicated, an explanation is attached.
Indictments, informations or complaints charging the following offenses also are pending
against the inmate in your state and you are hereby authorized to transfer the inmate to custody
of appropriate authorities in these jurisdictions for purposes of disposing of these indictments, informations or complaints.
Offense

County or Other Jurisdiction

Agg. Robbery

County, S a l t Lake C i t y

&gg. yiSnapping

County f Salt Lake City

Offense (cont'd)

County or Other Jurisdiction (cont'd)

If you do not intend to bring the inmate to trial, will you please inform us as soon as possible?

Kindly acknowledge.

(Name and Titl£~of Custodial Authority)

JU*gY: Peggy Kinman, Admin. System Mgr.

..U^E^.ioi3^QC^.35ill-JCLein.BJLYd>--LQmpoc
(Institution and Address)

93436

My counsel is
(Name of Counsel)!

whose address is ._.

R&„Skf&--£PA---$£l)iU(^J^-T&^J7tb3
(Street, City, and Staty)

-

-

^-

'

---1^0$y_2U_Z-ZZ33-- £n^...Y.2Hr.Ji?.fJ..

B. I request the court to appoint counsel.

[

FPLLOM.1.14*77

y

/

{Inmate's Signature)

ADDENDUM I

BP-DIR-91
2-71

BUREAU OF PRISONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In duplicate. One copy of this form, signed by the prisoner and the warden should be retained by the warden. One copy, signed by the Warden, should be retained by the prisoner.

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
NOTICE OF UNTRIED INDICTMENT, INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT
AND OF RIGHT TO REQUEST DISPOSITION

Inmate . - ] ^ I ™ l . l 5 5 J 7 . i L ^ ?

No. ^ ^ i P ^ / f ^ n s t .

^??I-^??iL c . 1 L™

Pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers, you are hereby informed that the following are the
untried indictments, informations, or complaints against you concerning which the undersigned
has knowledge, and the source and contests of each.
c
Taking a Motor Vehicle without Permission
Robbery in the F i r s t Degree *»«Kidnapping in the F i r s t Degree ^

/te&, aeaa. f j££ K;,#H/>',-*/*

^ f * - ? ^ * * * ' " < * ^ l»4#~
^
f

/

jrifer **(<£- c!ry/ ur+4.

You are hereby further advised that by the provisions of said Agreement you have the right to
request the appropriate prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction in which any such indictment, information or complaint is pending and the appropriate court that a final disposition be made thereof.
You shall then be brought to trial within 180 days, unless extended pursuant to provisions of the
Agreement, after you have caused to be delivered to said prosecuting officer and said court written notice of the place of your imprisonment and your said request, together with a certificate of
the custodial authority as more fully set forth in said Agreement. However, the court having jurisdication of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
Your request for final disposition will operate as a request for final disposition of all untried
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against
you from the state to whose prosecuting official your request for final disposition is specifically directed. Your request will also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or
proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein and a waiver of extradition to the state of
trial to serve any sentence there imposed upon you, after completion of your term of imprisonment in this state. Your request will also constitute a consent by you to the production of your body
in any court where your presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of the Agreement on Detainers and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the institution in which you
are now confined.
Should you desire such a request for final disposition of any untried indictment, information
or complaint, you are to notify _„JL°ur_CaseLl!ajia&er
0 f the institution in which
you are confined*

You are also advised that under provisions of said Agreement the prosecuting officer of a jurisdiction in which any such indictment, information or complaint is pending may institute proceedings to obtain a final disposition thereof. In such event, you may oppose the request that you be
delivered to such prosecuting officer or court. You may request the Warden to disapprove any such
request for your temporary custody but you cannot oppose delivery on the grounds that the Warden
has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
Edwin Meese, I I I , U.S. Attorney General
1

DATED: .J?*.. .* 1.1?!*-

(Insert Name and Title of Custodial Authority)

g y . Peggy A. Kinman
Administrative Systems Manager

RECEIVED

DATE
INMATE

,
MARTIN, Terry Dale

NO.

02960-051

FW LC 1-74 7IC T N I

ADDENDUM J

I

IS 67 (3-84) revised

LAW LIBRARY
CDM
I am requesting to be allowed to use the Law Library:
F R O M / ^ l / / ^ 7l££V
PRINT NAME

DATE/VbO J?,/?**"

/LOCATION S~S U *

2-z.

ERENCE:

CASE NUMBER__2o2l2_l_3
COURT JURISDICTION:
NOTE CHECK BLOCK PERTAINING TO CASE:
To i.,t

ncc

o„

*P MS, H,<rTc*v J/xnd*>iJs ,f

n is
^

D Civil Federal
U Civil District

etTUJiT**

., T- u

ASSIGNED OR ASSISTING ATTORNEY i??7h

*

Criminal

Federal

U Criminal District
U Other/Explain
ScHoe.U^^

ATTORNEY PHONE *?66 3 ^ 7 3

f

lAXM U

RESIDENT
IDP
C

/ed: CDM
APPROVED

SIGNATURE

DATE/^r -<£57TIME /S^
DISAPPROVED

REMARKS:

CDM SIGNATURE
W LIBRARY
FORWARDED FOR YOUR COMPLIANCE

DATE

3^*
/TIME

^

ADDENDUM K

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to . . . have a speedy public trial . . . .

2.

Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right . . . to have a speedy public trial . . . .

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953 as amended).
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district where the
offense is alleged to have been committed;

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1953 as amended).
See following pages.

DISPOSITION OP DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

77-29-5

77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged to be
incompetent to proceed under chapter 15.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. Escape from custody by
a prisoner after delivery of the written demand referred to in section
77-29-1(1) shall void the request.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law
— Text of agreement. The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby
enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions
legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner,
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and
orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or
complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to
such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction,
cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative procedures. It is the
further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof.

77-29-5

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a
penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request
of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned,
the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state
parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his
right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information
or complaint on which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers
and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the
prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being
initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph
shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request,
and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the

DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

77-29-5

shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required
in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall
void the request.
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance
with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts
in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
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(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall
be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment,
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof,
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state
where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such
person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary
custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of
this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority
in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided
by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the
place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the
custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon
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(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held
in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement,
time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall
be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state
and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any
other manner permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory
and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more
untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which
trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay
all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner.
The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement' providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and
in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said
time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally
ill.
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ARTICLE VII
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state
when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time
such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect
thereof.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force
and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Compliance standard.
The standard to which administration of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
should be held is substantial compliance with
the terms of the agreement and fundamental
fairness in the overall result. Hearn v. State
(1982) 642 P 2d 757.
Sentence in receiving state interrupted
for return to sending state.
There was substantial compliance with the
terms of this Agreement and no violation of
fundamental fairness in the fact that
prisoner's service of sentence in the receiving

state was interrupted for his return to the
sending state and is to be resumed, pursuant
to detainer from the receiving state, after he
completes service of his sentence in the sending state and an intervening federal sentence. Hearn v. State (1982) 642 P 2d 757.
I D *
Collateral References.
Validity, construction, and application of
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 98 ALR
Law Reviews.
Note, The State University's Place Among
Overlapping Police Jurisdictions During a
Student Mass Disturbance, 1971 Utah L. Rev.
474.
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